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Japan Disarmed: The Symbolism and
Rejection of the Defeated Soldier in
Japanese Social Media
Ian Ghows
On August 28 1945, the Empire of Japan formally
surrendered to the Allied nations.  The signing marked
the end of an era and the death knell of the militaristic
Empire.  It also left millions of Japanese servicemen
and colonists stranded abroad.  With Japan’s economy
crippled and its navy shattered, it was up to the Allies
to repatriate the colonists and surrendered Japanese
servicemen.  Many of these servicemen would not see
their homeland for years; others, especially those in
Soviet captivity, would never return.  Much has been
written about American soldiers’ homecoming and the
widespread euphoria in the United Kingdom following
the end of World War II, but less has been written on
the perspective of the vanquished.  This may be due to
the age-old adage that “History is written by the vic-
tors.”  Clichés aside, the topic of the Japanese home-
coming is a singular one that deserves as much
attention as the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. 
Where Pearl Harbor shocked the American public, the
official surrender did the same and much more to the
Japanese populace.  To hear the emperor, a man
whom many believed to be descended from a goddess,
outline his intention to surrender, and then to have
the Japanese islands occupied, provoked a deep soul-
searching within the Japanese.  The focus of this soul-
searching was directed at the politicians and, espe-
cially, the military who had led them to believe they
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were winning the war.  The cold, often hostile, recep-
tion of defeated Imperial Japanese servicemen, por-
trayed as invincible heroes by Japanese wartime
propaganda, and the attitudes of the Japanese people
as reflected in the social media of the time are indica-
tive of a natural Japanese shift towards pacifism and
a rejection of militarism.  
The pre-modern Japanese social structure had
placed the warrior class of society, the samurai, at the
top for hundreds of years.  They were the bureaucratic
social elite, but were also romanticized in classical
tales and songs extolling valor and virtues.  After the
Meiji Restoration in 1868, the samurai class was
abolished and replaced with a new Western-style
military elite in 1872.1  The birth of the Empire of
Japan also signaled the birth of Asia’s first modern
military, whose objective was to protect Japan from
any would-be imperial colonizer.  
As a means of avoiding predation, Japan linked its
modernization with joining the ranks of the imperial-
ists following the military defeat of China in 1895 and
of Russia in 1905.2  Propaganda and militarism in
Japan increased with each success.  Decades later,
Japan’s encroachment in Asia increased with post-
World War I colonies and the expansion into Manchu-
ria in 1931.  On the heels of these military successes,
the Japanese war machine seemed invincible.  When
Japan entered into military conflict with China in 1937
and the Allies in 1941, more successes followed as
      1 James L. Huffman, Modern Japan: An Encyclopedia of
History, Culture and Nationalism (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1998), 215, 241-42.
      2 Ibid..
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they conquered the Philippines, Malaya and Britain’s
“Fortress” Singapore in 1942.3  As Japan went from
victory to victory, the propaganda machine at home
continued to pump up the virtues of a strong military. 
When the war began to turn against Japan, Allied
bombers began their terrible fire-bombing raids and
Japanese defeats were reported by newspapers as
victories.  Then, the United States dropped two atomic
bombs and instantly killed hundreds of thousands of
Japanese soldiers and civilians in the cities of Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki.  Thus, when on 15 August 1945,
Emperor Hirohito informed his people that he intended
to surrender to prevent further loss of life, the lies
about inevitable military victory were exposed and the
trust between people and government shattered. 
Returning Japanese servicemen became a hated
symbol of the war and suffering to the Japanese
public, unnecessary in the postwar era, and this is
reflected heavily in the social media of the time.
Many scholars have recently taken up the subject
of the Japanese Empire.  Few, however, have gone into
as much depth as John W. Dower whose book, Em-
bracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II,
provides overviews, primary accounts and analysis of
the situation in postwar Japan.4  Dower’s work is
critical to this paper, especially his examination of the
all-important social, political, and economic factors
that shaped the defeated nation after the war.  Fur-
thermore, Dower stresses the important role of the
      3 Major General S. Woodburn Kirby, CB, CMG, CIE, OBE,
MC, Singapore: The Chain of Disaster (London: Cassell, 1971),
138-39.
      4 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of
World War II (New York: WW Norton, 1999), 1.
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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP),
General Douglas MacArthur, and his staff in the
formation of a new Japan.  This was to result in a
democratic Japan without the means to return to its
imperialistic ways.
The popular Japanese media after the end of the
American Occupation also offers insight into the
shifting discourse on the role of the military.  This may
be seen, for example, in the original Japanese release
of the film, Gojira, in 1954.5  Since it was released soon
after the end of American-imposed censorship, the film
presents criticism of many facets of the conduct of the
war and is reflective of the postwar attitude towards
anti-militarism which would not have been in the film
had censorship continued.  It cannot be doubted that
the film’s single greatest condemnation was directed at
the Americans for unleashing atomic and nuclear
weaponry, which cinematically created the well-known,
nigh-unstoppable fire-breathing green monster.  The
importance of this source is in its lasting popularity,
which is indicative of its warm reception by a sympa-
thetic audience.  Godzilla became a national icon for
Japan due to the popularity of the 1954 film.
Other works that examine Japanese attitudes
towards the military include Murakami Hyôe’s Japan:
The Years of Trial 1945-1952, written by a Japanese
veteran-turned-reporter who makes great use of
Japanese sources unavailable in English; Bushido, by
Nitobe Inazo, written in 1905 and reflective of the
militaristic attitude in pre-war Japan; and The Atomic
      5 Ishiro Honda, Gojira: The Original Japanese Masterpiece,
Including the U.S. theatrical release Godzilla, King of the
Monsters, 2 Disc DVD & Booklet (Tokyo: Toho, 1954, 1956).
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Bomb Suppressed: American Censorship in Occupied
Japan, by Monica Braw, which addresses the inconsis-
tencies of American policies in Japan regarding cen-
sorship and the atomic bombings.6
Defeat in 1945 prompted a rejection of the milita-
ristic symbols and traditions that had led Japan to
humiliation, and this strongly-felt sentiment is made
clear in the postwar period media.  The collective
Japanese psyche shifted dramatically, and few schol-
ars have examined the central issue of Japanese
demilitarization.  This paper attempts to illuminate the
societal perspective of the vanquished Japanese soldier
after the war and show how that experience was
subsequently manifested in public opinion via social
media.
Japan, like Germany, has come a long way since
1945 but, unlike Germany, it has not been as active in
global politics.  As Dower says in the introduction to
Embracing Defeat, “What matters is what the Japanese
themselves made of their experience of defeat, then
and thereafter; and for a half century now, most have
consistently made it the touchstone for affirming a
commitment to ‘peace and democracy.’”7  But in the
early days of the Occupation, everything was uncer-
tain.  Millions of Japanese servicemen deployed
overseas, from Manchuria and China to Burma and
      6 Murakami Hyôe, Japan: The Years of Trial 1945-1952
(Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1982); Nitobe Inazo, Bushido:
The Classic Portrait of Samurai Martial Culture (Tokyo: Tuttle
Publishing, 1969); Monica Braw, The Atomic Bomb Suppressed:
American Censorship in Occupied Japan (New York: M.E.
Sharpe, 1991); 
      7 Dower, 30.
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the Dutch East Indies, had been left stranded.8  So too
were millions of Japanese civilians who had emigrated
as colonists.9  Despite hopes of a quick repatriation,
many were to die outside Japan after the war’s end
while others would take years to return.  Allied forces,
including the Americans, British and Dutch, employed
Japanese men taken prisoner after the surrender as
unpaid physical laborers up until 1947, often to
rebuild and reassert the Westerners’ colonial rule in
Asia.
American Influence on Japanese Opinion
The topic of Japanese attitudes as reflected by
popular social media is an extremely complex one
given that it is a matter of perspective and how these
varied perspectives influenced the course of events.  In
addition to the Japanese people’s malaise (kyôdatsu)
in the early years of the Occupation, the presence of
American forces themselves conditioned Japanese
attitudes towards the military.10  Despite MacArthur’s
attempts to present the image of a functional Japanese
government, SCAP remade Japan in the way it saw fit. 
For example, when the Japanese government in 1946
made minimal changes in the wording of the new
Constitution demanded by SCAP, MacArthur ordered
SCAP’s Government Section to create a draft of the
new Constitution “to show the Japanese how it was
done.”11  Murakami describes then-Prime Minister
Shidehara Kijûrô’s reaction to the new Constitution
      8 Ibid,, 48.
      9 Ibid..
      10 Dower, 88-89.
      11 Ibid, 360.
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which banned any and all armed forces as “unthink-
able, but, on learning that this was one of MacArthur’s
idealistic obsessions, [Shidehara] gave up any idea of
opposition.”12 Japanese newspapers printed the full,
complete draft of the Constitution for the Japanese
public to examine on March 6.13  At the time, it was
publicly known that there was no consensus in the
government and the draft itself was dotted with
“expressions and ideas that were quaintly alien.”14 
However, both MacArthur and Hirohito publicly
endorsed this draft, thereby ending any possibility of
revision.
One must also be aware that the opinions ex-
pressed in the censored social media were picked and
chosen and that the general Japanese public cannot
be fully represented in such a limited scope.  Newspa-
pers, magazines, books, films, and a host of other
forms of communications had to be translated prior to
publication, and certain topics such as anything
related to the atomic bombings, were taboo with
unwritten but very real consequences if they were
discussed.15  When the newspapers released the draft
Constitution, American censors “suppressed all but
laudatory comments.”16  As a result, rumors spread by
word of mouth that SCAP had browbeaten Prime
Minister Shidehara and his cabinet into accepting the
Constitution without objections.17  So why was MacAr-
      12 Murakami, 202.
      13 Kazuo Kawai, Japan’s American Interlude (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 52.
      14 Ibid..
      15 Braw, 82-3.
      16 Kawai, 52.
      17 Ibid, 53.
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thur, presented as a man so keen on establishing
democracy in Japan, engaging in undemocratic
activity?  
The answer is probably that MacArthur did not
trust the Japanese not to return to militarism.  To
ensure that Japan became a democracy and never
returned its old habits, those who supported milita-
rism had to be stripped of their political foundation as
well as their ability to spread their ideas.  MacArthur,
as a military man, was more likely to respond with a
typically military order than he was to actually let the
Japanese government make a decision.  By imposing
a Constitution endorsed by the Emperor, MacArthur
ensured that there was no legitimate reason to milita-
rize.  Article 9 reads, “…the Japanese people forever
renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and
the threat or use of force as means of settling interna-
tional disputes … Land, sea, and air forces, as well as
other war potential, will never be maintained. The right
of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”18
Censorship ensured that any attempt to coordinate
a large-scale rebellion against the government would
be discovered.  Susan Braw also asserts that censor-
ship was used to steer the Japanese public away from
criticizing the government and the Americans as well
as to promote democratization.19  The use of censor-
ship during the Occupation meant that the Americans’
filtered social media to fit American political agendas. 
This means that the social media of the time deliber-
      18 “Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, The No-War Clause,”
Japan-101.com, http://www.japan-
101.com/government/article_9_of_japan.htm, (accessed 1 Mar.
2012).
      19 Braw, 28-29.
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ately expressed anti-militaristic themes so as to
conform to SCAP’s Press Code.  As a result, it is not an
entirely accurate means of assessing the Japanese
public’s attitude.
Similarly, the International Military Tribune for the
Far East, also known as the Tokyo War Crimes Trials,
played a role in placing blame entirely upon the
Japanese.  The entire nation was culpable, guilty of
association with and support for the militaristic
regime.  Of the twenty-eight Class A defendants, seven
were sentenced to death by hanging, thirteen were
imprisoned for life, five were imprisoned for varying
lengths of time, two died during the trial and one was
deemed unfit to stand trial because of mental derange-
ment.20 
Censorship thus limited the use of government
publications and statements to gain an accurate
assessment of the Japanese public’s shifting opinions. 
To gain a better understanding of the Japanese mind-
set of the pre-war era, one must examine the literature
of the period.  One such work, Nitobe Inazo’s 1905
book, Bushido, offers an interpretation of the samurai
code:  “Chivalry is no less indigenous to the soil of
Japan than its emblem, the cherry blossom,” he says;
“It is a living object of power and beauty among us.”21 
Despite the abolition of the samurai class in 1873,
Nitobe holds that samurai values were not only perti-
nent but present in 1905 Japan.  This is not the
aggressive, nationalistic militarism that arose in Japan
during the 1930s but, Nitobe’s work nevertheless
shows that there was a pre-existing martial pride that
      20 Murakami, 212.
      21 Nitobe, 1.
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served as a foundation for the militarism of the 1930s. 
“As among flowers, the cherry is queen, so among men
the samurai is lord,” Nitobe asserts.22  The samurai
can act as a metaphor for the Imperial Japanese
military, who were the new warrior-heroes of Japanese
modernity in the pre-war era.  Nitobe notes in the
chapter regarding the training of samurai, “A samurai
was essentially a man of action.  Science was without
the pale of his activity.  He took advantage of it in so
far as it concerned his profession of arms.”23  This
disdain of non-military sciences had not disappeared
when the samurai were abolished in the 19th century. 
In fact, it was arguably accelerated by the need to
develop modern weapons to protect Japan from
colonial annexation by a western power.  A strong and
modern military was the only preventive measure that
the Japanese believed could preserve their country
from the western imperial powers.  One must note,
however, that Nitobe’s publication in 1905 is a fore-
shadowing of, but not the same as, the militarism that
would grow in Japan during the 1930s, which took
thoughts like Nitobe’s to an even greater extreme.
The Attitudes of Repatriated Soldiers and Sailors
One such extreme that was promoted during the
war by Japan’s military government was the ostracism
of the defeated.  As a result, Japanese soldiers and
sailors taken prisoner overseas were fearful of their
postwar homecoming despite their desire for it.  Many
were plagued by fears of social ostracism by the people
      22 Ibid,, 111.
      23 Ibid., 65.
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      20 Murakami, 212.
      21 Nitobe, 1.
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served as a foundation for the militarism of the 1930s. 
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      22 Ibid,, 111.
      23 Ibid., 65.
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they had failed to protect.24  In fact, as Murakami
points out, “the majority of Japanese condemned the
former Japanese army and navy out of hand…no one
was interested in …whether they had distinguished
themselves…or whether they had been prisoners.”25 
However, when one considers the soldiers’ fears
alongside the deep stigma associated with surrender
and being taken prisoner, the reason becomes clearer. 
Japanese society had been conditioned to hold men
who surrendered in contempt to the point where it was
considered more honorable to die in battle than to be
taken prisoner and escape captivity.26
So to what kind of welcome did Japanese soldiers
and sailors return?  Cities and homes devastated by
American bombers forced many Japanese to live in
shantytowns.27  Many veterans who were demobilized,
dressed in rags without resemblance to the smart
uniforms of wartime propaganda, were shunned by
their communities as defeated men stripped of their
honor.  Returning servicemen from China and other
overseas posts were often hit doubly hard.  By 1946,
many Japanese had heard of stories of the atrocities
committed by Imperial Japanese soldiers.  As a result,
they were often considered to be social pariahs and
participants in horrible war crimes.  In letters to the
press, veterans spoke about how they received scorn
from both acquaintances and strangers alike.  Some
voiced their sincere regret for these crimes whilst
      24 Murakami, 226.
      25 Ibid., 226-27.
      26 Walter Skya, Japan’s Holy War: The Ideology of Radical
Shinto Ultranationalism (London: Duke University Press, 2009),
263-64
      27 Dower, 48.
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others protested their innocence and indignation at
being treated as war criminals.28
A sizeable number of repatriated soldiers found
that they had been declared dead, with “their funerals
conducted and grave markers erected.”29  The return
of someone believed dead caused a varied range of
emotions, from joy to heartbreak.  Stories circulated
about returning soldiers finding out that their wife had
remarried, often to a brother or close friend.30  The
reality of these stories is unknown but their presence
is an example of the widespread confusion and trage-
dies brought on by the end of the war.  Many letters to
newspapers contained pleas for the public to distin-
guish between the men who had been simple soldiers
in the service of their country with the “military cli-
ques” who had been responsible for the conduct of the
war.  This suggests that the Japanese public, as a
whole, was not making this distinction.  The military
had led them to war and so, in defeat, the military was,
rightly or wrongly, at fault for all of it, though as we
shall see, soldiers, individually, may not have been
blamed.
During the process of demobilization, Japanese and
American soldiers cooperated to ensure that the
process went smoothly.  In the reports made by
General MacArthur and those made by the Japanese
government’s ministry tasked with demobilization
stated, “No disorders; no opposition; cooperation
      28 Ibid., 60.
      29 Ibid..
      30 Ibid..
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continues.”31  The lack of disruptions and the ready
compliance of the Japanese forces to demobilize
immediately show that even the soldiers were tired of
fighting.  In his reports, MacArthur pointed out the
hugely disproportionate ratio of American to Japanese
troops.  Two and a half American divisions were in
charge of “fifty-nine Japanese divisions, thirty-six
brigades, and forty-five-odd regiments plus naval and
air forces,” totaling roughly 3.5 million Japanese
soldiers.32  Had the Japanese men chosen to, they
could easily have ousted a relaxed, though cautious
invader.  Instead, they complied swiftly with orders to
disarm and without the least resistance or complaint. 
MacArthur relates an anecdote in his report that
exemplifies the cooperative spirit between the Imperial
Japanese forces and their American Occupation
counterparts during the process of demobilization.  An
American jeep encountered a Japanese tank column
on the way to a disarmament depot.  To let the jeep
pass, the Japanese commander ordered his tanks to
halt.  MacArthur continues,
“As the lead tank stopped to permit passing, the
jeep driver cautiously skirted it to the left on the
narrow road. The soft shoulder crumbled and
the American found himself tilted at a perilous
angle with his vehicle mired in the soft muck of
      31 Douglas MacArthur, “Reports of General MacArthur,
MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: The Military Phase,
Volume I Supplement,” Army.mil,
http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur
Reports/MacArthur V1 Sup/ch5.htm, (accessed 20 March
2012).
      32 Ibid..
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a rice paddy. Climbing out, the officer scratched
his head and pointed to a cable attached to the
side of one tank. Meanwhile a Japanese officer
had come running up and asked in passable
English if the tank driver had been at fault.
Assured to the contrary, he barked orders to his
men and the tank driver jockeyed his tank into
position, hooked the cable on the jeep and
pulled it back on the road. The Japanese cap-
tain bowed his apologies, accepted an American
cigarette with thanks, ordered his tank column
to continue and, waving amiably to the Ameri-
can, disappeared in a cloud of dust.
A month earlier these men would have shot one
another on sight. Significantly, the Japanese
armored unit was travelling without guard to be
demobilized; the Americans and the Japanese
alike were integrated in a demobilization pro-
gram which was evidently successful.”33
If incidents such as this tank column roaming the
country unguarded were common, it implies that the
American occupiers had achieved a rapport with their
Japanese colleagues that eliminated the need for
armed American guards to accompany the Japanese
on the way to their depots for disarmament.
For those who did not return, efforts were made by
relatives of missing servicemen to petition Gen. MacAr-
thur.  In April 1950, he received a “remarkable appeal
from some 120,000 individuals … all of them relatives
of still-missing soldiers,” accompanied by an embroi-
      33 Ibid..
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dered portrait of MacArthur.34   This is, as Dower
points out, an imitation of the wartime practice of
sending handmade sennin-bari haramaki, or
“thousand-stitch belly bands,” as an affirmation of the
close bonds between the people at home and the
soldiers abroad.35  This appeal points out that family
members had no desire to blame their loved ones in
uniform.  To them, there was no shame in acknowledg-
ing that their husbands, brothers, sons were soldiers
who lost the war.  They expressed only an innate
human desire to reunite the family with their missing
relatives.  This suggests that the public’s contempt of
veterans was not always directed against the soldiers
themselves but rather at the militarism and humilia-
tion that they represented.
The sad truth is that many who returned to their
native Japan returned as ashes.  Many Japanese
orphans were repatriated with their families’ remains
tied around their neck in white boxes.  Servicemen
returning from abroad performed the same duty for
their deceased comrades, endeavoring to find their
friends’ relatives to give them some closure.36  Terrific
efforts were made by these soldiers to see to their
responsibility to their deceased comrades before
attempting to reconnect with their own loved ones.
Many of the former servicemen were “cynical and
contemptuous of the officers who had led them in
battle.”37  In a letter to the Asahi newspaper one former
enlisted soldier wrote about how enlisted men died of
      34 Dower, 50-52.
      35 Ibid, 52.
      36 Ibid, 57.
      37 Ibid, 58.
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starvation more often than officers and asked, “How he
could give comfort to the souls of his dead com-
rades.”38 Tominaga Shôzô, and over a thousand of his
comrades captured in Manchuria did not return to
Japan until 1956.  They had been handed over by
Soviet troops to Communist Chinese troops, and kept
in captivity for trial.  Most were acquitted on the basis
that they had shown sincere repentance during their
captivity and were then repatriated to Japan.  “I didn’t
even feel that I had returned to my motherland… I got
off the ship and walked past the welcoming crowd until
I encountered my wife’s face,” Tominaga says.  Even
worse, in the sixteen years since Tominaga had left for
China, his daughter had grown up entirely without
him: “the girl standing there like a stranger was my
daughter.”39
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial and the Japanese
Reaction
Another factor that had huge impact on the post-
war Japanese public was the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, also known as the Tokyo
War Crimes Trial.  The types and numbers of convicts
in the Tokyo War Crimes Trials offer insight into the
public’s acceptance of war responsibility.  For “crimes
against peace” twenty five “Class A” criminals were
accused and found guilty.40  Seven were hanged,
thirteen imprisoned for life and two were imprisoned
for lesser terms.41  No acquittals were made for these
      38 Ibid, 59.
      39 Haruko Taya Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New
York: New Press, 1992), 468.
      40 Ibid, 22.
      41 Ibid..
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men.  Judge Radhabinod B. Pal led the dissenting
votes by reasoning that victory did not grant the right
to try the defeated and that the Allies were in no
position to pass fair judgment on the Japanese
crimes.42  He even argued that if Japan were to be tried
for the “indiscriminate slaughter of civilians, then
America too should be arraigned for dropping the
atomic bomb.”43  Pal felt that the “retroactive applica-
tion of new law… was tantamount to the victors’
arbitrary exercise of power.”44  The Tokyo War Crimes
Trial was a show trial meant to publicly pin the re-
sponsibility of the war on the Japanese and to publicly
punish the wartime leadership for their actions.  
Murakami Hyôe examines the data and differenti-
ates the various convicts. Murakami’s first point deals
with Tôjô Hideki, the military prime minister from
1941-44 who was labeled as a “Class A” criminal.  Tôjô
had intended to argue every accusation placed against
him and attempt to justify Japan’s actions.  Marquis
Kido Kôichi, a fellow “Class A” criminal and one of the
Emperor’s closest advisors, stopped Tôjô by pointing
out that such arguments would involve the Emperor
and resurrect the issue of his culpability.45  Tôjô
changed his approach to ensure that he would assume
sole responsibility to allow the emperor to remain
blameless.  In his own way, Tôjô guaranteed the
preservation of the Imperial dynasty and helped Japan
recover from the humiliation by shouldering the em-
      42 Murakami, 213.
      43 Ibid..
      44 Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trials (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2008), 219.
      45 Murakami, 210.
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peror’s guilt himself.46
Godzilla and His Symbolism
The media during the Occupation, as has been
previously mentioned, was strictly controlled.  There-
fore, to get a view of Japanese public sentiment, one
should turn to movies. An excellent example is Gojira,
directed by Honda Ishiro in 1954.  Gojira is full of
subtle anti-war and anti-nuclear metaphors.  The
name, “Godzilla,” is an Americanization of the Japa-
nese name Gojira and the two are relatively inter-
changeable.47  The movie was produced after the end
of the American Occupation and its censorship.  The
premise of the movie is that due to nuclear bomb
testing, a dinosaur living at the bottom of the ocean
was exposed to a huge amount of radiation which
mutated and angered the beast.  The protagonist
lovers are Ogata, a Japanese Coast Guard sailor, and
Emiko, a nurse and daughter of Japan’s leading
paleontologist, Dr. Yamane.  As Godzilla’s mysterious
attacks at sea turn into invasions of Tokyo, Ogata and
the rest of Japan’s defense forces prove incapable of
stopping the monster from destroying Tokyo and
killing its inhabitants.  It is only when the enigmatic
Dr. Serizawa reluctantly reveals and uses his Oxygen
Destroyer that Godzilla is killed, much to the sadness
of Dr. Yamane.  In its original release version, the
movie contained messages that would not have been
permitted by American censors.  In fact, the 1955
American release cut most of the scenes referencing
the atomic bomb or Japan’s experiences in the war to
      46 Dower, 460-61.
      47 Honda, Gojira,(DVD).
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give the movie a more light-hearted ending.  The
popularity of the franchise, combined with Godzilla’s
status as a symbol of Japanese monster movies, make
it an excellent example of post-censorship material,
unimpeded by strict foreign censorship.48
The anti-war theme is reflected in multiple in-
stances.  First, Ogata is a member of the Coast Guard
tasked with rescuing Godzilla’s earliest victims:
fishermen attacked at sea.  Ogata’s occupation is not
necessarily a military job but it is still a martial job
with similarities to a military force.  Its title and
mission, however, are purely separated from the
military so that Ogata possesses the same martial
bearing as a military man but with a more benevolent
purpose, consistent with Japan’s postwar prohibition
of war.  The first attack against Godzilla is conducted
by Coast Guard frigates that launched depth charges
in the area where they thought Godzilla resided.  In
disgust, Dr. Yamane comments that, “All they [the
government] think about is killing Godzilla.”49  It is a
thinly-veiled critique of violence as a solution when
other alternatives remain unexplored.  
To prepare for an invasion by Godzilla after the
failed naval attack, the Coast Guard and the Army set
up an elaborate defensive plan around Tokyo Bay.  The
use of the term “Army” by the English-language
subtitling may refer to the newly created Japan Self
Defense Forces or it may refer to a generic army
      48 One necessary disclaimer is needed.  This author is not
fluent in Japanese and viewed the 1954 film in Japanese with
English subtitles.  As a result, all quotes from the movie are
subtitles taken from the movie and the author cannot verify the
accuracy of the translations.
      49 Ibid..
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organization that is not the Imperial Japanese Army. 
Regardless, the army in the movie is a well-stocked
defense force with machine guns, heavy artillery, tanks
and electric wire towers.  None of these modern
weapons, however, impede Godzilla’s rampage in
Tokyo.  As Godzilla is heading back to sea, the Air
Force appears in modern jets, firing rockets at the
monster.  The rockets seem to do little more than
annoy Godzilla, who subsequently submerges beneath
the water.  From the ruins, survivors cheer the Air
Force jets as they attack Godzilla.  But the monster’s
departure raises the question of whether he would
have left even without the Air Force’s attack and
whether the cheering survivors echo the survivors of
Allied bombings who continued to support the Japa-
nese war effort in the last days of World War II.  The
clear conclusion is that the military solution failed to
kill, deter or even shorten Godzilla’s attack on Tokyo. 
The movie steers the audience to see how useless the
military is when, despite its best efforts, Tokyo is in
ruins.  
The protagonist couple, Emiko and Ogata, is a
metaphor as well, representing the future of Japan
that hopes for a brighter tomorrow.  Oppositely, Dr.
Serizawa is introduced as a veteran of the war who is
trying to better the world but cannot because he is
unable to find a beneficial use for his invention, the
Oxygen Destroyer.  Serizawa is only persuaded to use
the Oxygen Destroyer against Godzilla after watching
schoolchildren sing a song named “Oh Peace, Oh
Light, Return,” whose lyrics (according to the subtitles)
go, “May we live without destruction/May we look to
tomorrow with hope/May Peace and Light return to
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English subtitles.  As a result, all quotes from the movie are
subtitles taken from the movie and the author cannot verify the
accuracy of the translations.
      49 Ibid..
182 Historical Perspectives June 2012
organization that is not the Imperial Japanese Army. 
Regardless, the army in the movie is a well-stocked
defense force with machine guns, heavy artillery, tanks
and electric wire towers.  None of these modern
weapons, however, impede Godzilla’s rampage in
Tokyo.  As Godzilla is heading back to sea, the Air
Force appears in modern jets, firing rockets at the
monster.  The rockets seem to do little more than
annoy Godzilla, who subsequently submerges beneath
the water.  From the ruins, survivors cheer the Air
Force jets as they attack Godzilla.  But the monster’s
departure raises the question of whether he would
have left even without the Air Force’s attack and
whether the cheering survivors echo the survivors of
Allied bombings who continued to support the Japa-
nese war effort in the last days of World War II.  The
clear conclusion is that the military solution failed to
kill, deter or even shorten Godzilla’s attack on Tokyo. 
The movie steers the audience to see how useless the
military is when, despite its best efforts, Tokyo is in
ruins.  
The protagonist couple, Emiko and Ogata, is a
metaphor as well, representing the future of Japan
that hopes for a brighter tomorrow.  Oppositely, Dr.
Serizawa is introduced as a veteran of the war who is
trying to better the world but cannot because he is
unable to find a beneficial use for his invention, the
Oxygen Destroyer.  Serizawa is only persuaded to use
the Oxygen Destroyer against Godzilla after watching
schoolchildren sing a song named “Oh Peace, Oh
Light, Return,” whose lyrics (according to the subtitles)
go, “May we live without destruction/May we look to
tomorrow with hope/May Peace and Light return to
20
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 17 [2012], Art. 13
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol17/iss1/13
Japan Disarmed 183
us.”50  Serizawa agrees to use the weapon, on the
condition that he would be allowed to destroy all of his
notes and work first to prevent anyone else from
replicating the Oxygen Destroyer.  Later in the movie,
he and Ogata descend into the sea in diving suits, and
before activating the Oxygen Destroyer, Serizawa
yanks on Ogata’s line to signal to the people on the
boat to haul him up.  The scientist then activates the
Oxygen Destroyer and says to Ogata that he hopes he
and Emiko are happy together before cutting his
oxygen and rope line to the boat.  Both Ogata and
Emiko are devastated that the man killed himself to
give them a better future and that they had caused
him to take his own life to prevent the knowledge of his
dangerous invention from being copied.
It is made clear in the movie that the military was
unable to do anything about Godzilla, that their
weapons and attacks did nothing more than invite
further retaliation.  The answer could only be found in
a terrifically powerful and terrifying weapon named the
Oxygen Destroyer.  This implies a message of the end
of the military’s usefulness and the growing impor-
tance of science to shape the world.  The movie is a
rejection of militaristic solutions and a message that
nuclear weapons cannot lead to anything but more
death and sorrow.  Nevertheless, it adds a cautionary
message that science is also a double edged tool.  It
was the pursuit of science that created the atomic
bombs and could lead to weapons far more lethal.  If
one were to view Godzilla as a metaphor for the Ameri-
cans during World War II, the criticism of the military
and their response becomes even more scathing
      50 Ibid..
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because it highlights their inability to defend the
country.  When viewed in such a light, one cannot help
but notice a cruel irony.  The whole point of moderniz-
ing Japan’s military, from the Meiji period in the 1880s
up to 1945, was to defend Japan from foreign occupa-
tion.51  Instead, the military’s actions had provoked the
very conflict the Japanese had sought to avoid and, in
turn, invited the Occupation they had wished to
prevent.
The anti-nuclear theme that is predominant in the
movie cannot be downplayed.  Geiger counters are
used frequently in the movie to show radiation levels. 
Many of these anti-nuclear messages are embedded in
scenes that reference World War II.  The first report of
Godzilla’s attack was that there was a “sudden explo-
sion,” reminiscent of the atomic bombs’ detonation.52 
Godzilla’s first landfall on Odo Island leaves large, deep
impressions that are radioactive and dangerous to the
public.  Dr. Yamane presents his findings to the
Japanese Diet: “Recent nuclear experimental detona-
tions may have drastically altered its natural habitats. 
I would even speculate that a hydrogen bomb explo-
sion may have removed it from its surroundings.”53  To
support this, he quotes how sand found where Godzil-
la had trod contained Strontium-90, a radioactive
element only found in atomic bomb detonations, which
led him to believe that Godzilla must have absorbed a
massive amount of radiation and still survived.54
      51 Theodore F. Cook Jr., Barbara Molony, ed., “Making
‘Soldiers,’” Gendering Modern Japanese History (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2005), 263-65.
      52 Ibid..
      53 Ibid..
      54 Ibid..
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The young Ogata felt that they should kill Godzilla
to prevent him from spreading death and suffering.  He
bluntly asked, “Isn’t Godzilla a product of the atomic
bomb, which still haunts many of us Japanese?”  To
which, Yamane, who had been arguing for a study of
the monster, responded angrily: “Don’t you think we
should study this creature which lives regardless of
the radiation it absorbs?”55
There is a memorable scene that speaks out against
nuclear weapons and the horrific aftermath inflicted
on humans.  It starts by showing the destruction of
Tokyo where the landscape is almost entirely flat, with
only partial remains of walls, street posts and piles of
rubble to give the impression that this was once a city. 
It is an image that is starkly reminiscent of the after-
math of the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
where entire city blocks were leveled by the blast.  The
scene then cuts to the hospital where Emiko is helping
a doctor, who is holding a Geiger counter to a child. 
The doctor shakes his head as he gets the reading and
moves on, leaving Emiko to find a way to comfort the
mother whose child is doomed to die from radiation
exposure, received from Godzilla’s presence.
In the context of the Japanese social rejection of
militarism post-World War II, Gojira makes a clear
distinction about the powerlessness of the most
modern military weapons and the growing anti-milita-
rism in Japan.  The movie’s intent is to show how
detrimental the military solution is to human society
and that all wars, whether nuclear or conventional,
invite only more death and destruction.
      55 Ibid..
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Conclusions
It is clear that the American Occupation under
MacArthur and SCAP intended to remodel Japan into
a democracy in the hopes that it would never become
a militaristic nation again.  For this, they needed
scapegoats.  The most visible scapegoats were, natu-
rally, the defeated soldiers and their leaders.  The
International Military Tribunal for the Far East very
publicly sentenced most of Japan’s wartime leadership
to death or lifetime imprisonment.  The American
censorship program did likewise by allowing criticism
of wartime leadership and anti-militaristic opinions to
be published while suppressing all views supporting
militarism.  This makes it impossible to say with any
certainty that the social media of the Occupation
period accurately reflected the Japanese public’s
opinions.  However, it can be said that there was
staunch anti-militarism and criticism of the wartime
leadership in the wake of Japan’s defeat that came
from both the civilian and ex-military sectors of the
Japanese population, though in varying forms.
Regardless of the American influence during the
Occupation, it is evident that the Japanese public
would have leaned towards pacifism.  The atomic
bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki left deep emo-
tional scars on the public psyche.  This is evident in
the popular 1954 movie, Gojira, which does a very
good job of highlighting the military’s failure to stop
Godzilla, a metaphor for the Americans and the danger
of nuclear weapons.  Japanese post-war pacifism
probably differed from what was envisioned by MacAr-
thur and SCAP.  Most likely – mirroring – Prime
Minister Shidehara’s sentiments, it may have involved
some form of standing armed forces, reminiscent of the
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modern Japan Self Defense Forces, and they would
have been limited to deployment on the Japanese
home islands.  This is, however, a moot point when
one considers how former servicemen were extremely
critical of the wartime leadership and their conduct.
Most importantly, the Japanese soldier in the
aftermath of World War II presents a strange paradox. 
He is a symbol of the onerous wartime militaristic
faction which led Japan to defeat and humiliation, but
at the same time, he is a victim of that war.  The
soldier who had defended the home islands before
being demobilized was merely reviled.  The soldier who
returned from overseas suffered long periods of physi-
cal labor at the hands of Allied captors.  He received
the same rebuke from his community, but at least he
was able to reunite with some of his family.  Finally,
the image of the missing soldier, whose fate is un-
known, begs for sympathy for both him and his loved
ones on a humanistic level because that is, ultimately,
not a form of suffering one could wish upon another. 
Each of these three categories can be found in the
analysis of postwar Japan and the views regarding
soldiers.
To one degree or another, following their defeat and
the full accounting of facts, most Japanese became
opposed to Japan’s involvement in World War II.  This
was helped along, in part, by the American Occupa-
tion’s policies.  However, any kind of drastic social
change cannot be accepted by the general populace
unless there is a willingness already in place to
change.  To do so without this willingness would
reduce the effectiveness of any change.  The fact that
the majority of the Japanese readily accepted the anti-
militarist limitations of the new Constitution and that
188 Historical Perspectives June 2012
the demobilized soldier came to represent a shameful
period of Japanese history at all speaks to the anti-
militaristic tendencies already present in the Japanese
public.  When amplified in social media by censorship,
one would think that the sentiments were foisted upon
the Japanese but that would not be wholly true.  It is
only when one examines social media after the end of
censorship that any understanding of Japanese
sentiment can be formed.  With Gojira as an example,
one comes to the conclusion that the military was
rejected by the Japanese social media.  One cannot
underestimate the amount of soul-searching done by
the Japanese immediately after World War II and it is
evident that they would have rejected a return of
militarism, which had led them to incur such devastat-
ing physical and emotional losses.
Ian Ghows is a graduating Senior History major at
Santa Clara University.  He is from Singapore and
credits his grandfathers for his interest in History
thanks to all the stories they told him as a child. 
Following graduation, he intends to work as a teacher
before applying for graduate school to get a Masters in
History.
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